The Last Frontier: Market Creation in Conflict Zones, Deep Rural Areas and Urban Slums
As the world enters a period of economic instability there is a pressing need for companies to identify new horizons of growth. Previous research has proposed that the markets at the base of the economic pyramid (BOP) could serve as potential areas for growth 1 . As a result, a lot has been written on the strategies that would allow
Western multinationals to serve profitably the poor consumers at the BOP 2 .
Like many others, we have also explored how companies could do business in BOP markets. In an earlier study, we identified four critical elements for success in serving low-income consumers in developing markets-what we defined as the 4As framework: Affordability, Availability, Awareness and Acceptability 3 . But our earlier research has alerted us to the fact that even within the BOP markets, there exists the most unlikely of markets awaiting exploration. This market has its own unique key success factors and requires unique strategies from the companies that attempt to exploit it. The market that we refer to is made up of conflict zones, urban slums and deep rural areas. These three operating environments pose unique challenges for firms. But the benefits that accrue to the local population when private firms do business in these areas are enormous, even by BOP standards.
The rest of the BOP literature explores how companies could serve the world's poorest people in a profitable way. Urban slums and deep rural areas are taken as part of the BOP market so the existing literature already deals with the central question of our study. However, the existing literature does not consider these areas as different from other BOP markets and therefore proposes that the strategies needed to succeed in BOP markets are applicable to conflict zones, urban slums and deep rural areas. Our earlier work has alerted us to the fact that this might not be the case 4 . These complex operating environments are different from other BOP markets. They have different structural characteristics to other BOP markets and as a result, require different strategies from the ones needed to succeed in any BOP market.
Our present study examined several firms that strategically innovated in such complex environments. Our aim was to understand the reasons behind their success and to all African countries have more than 20% of their population electrified and paved roads are the exception rather than the rule. Fewer than 2% of DRC's roadways are paved, compared to 5% in Nigeria. In India paved roads represent 30% of the total but in the rainy season the unpaved sections of some parts of the road network become all but un-trafficable to automotive transportation 8 . But conflict zones are not only those areas of armed conflict driven by ethnic tensions, religious conflict or ideology. Lawlessness and criminality are also reported in regions such as the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the slums of Rio de Janeiro and Mexico City, and some parts of deep rural India. These environments pose unique challenges for firms, including very real risks of physical assault, robbery, kidnapping, blackmail, vandalism and theft.
Conflict zones
There are significant differences across the three complex operating environments described above, but our research has identified a number of common challenges that are present across all of these new market spaces:
Lack of Legal Frameworks: Complex operating environments often lack functioning legal systems and can be outside the control of government institutions. In these environments it can be very difficult for firms to put in place legally enforceable contracts.
Absence of Key Infrastructure:
Complex operating environments often lack critical infrastructure to underpin efficient commerce. In urban slums and deep rural areas this infrastructure can be simply absent while in conflict zones, infrastructure can be damaged, purposefully vandalized or stolen.
Shortage of Skilled People:
This involves two dimensions -availability and willingness. In some complex operating environments, people cannot afford formal education or schooling systems have been severely disrupted and skilled employees are hard to find. In conflict zones, employees and business partners can be understandably reluctant to face personal risks to their safety.
Other BOP markets lack key infrastructure and skilled people. But it is only in the three environments we are examining here that such absence is accompanied by violence, lawlessness, criminality and a total absence of government institutions. It is the combination of all these shortcomings that make these markets so different from other BOP markets and so challenging for firms to operate in.
Can firms do business in such environments?
How could firms operate in such inhospitable environments? We know from earlier research on firms operating in BOP markets that with the right business model, firms have the potential not just to deliver needed products and services to underserved local communities but to also realize sustainable profit and enable local economic empowerment 9 . But slums and conflict zones present unparalleled challenges to companies. Is it possible to operate profitably in these environments?
To answer this question, we undertook a two-year research project between 2006 and 2008, using an action-based methodology, founded on enquiry, analysis and testing.
As process research, the study focused on understanding the causal dynamics of particular settings with an assumption that "causation is neither linear nor singular" 10 .
We aimed to articulate best practices as companies deal with the challenges of serving customers in conflict zones, urban slums and the deep rural areas of developing markets and in many respects explored strategies that were still evolving.
From the business press and personal contact, we first identified several companies who had been operating successfully in the three kinds of environment under study since 2005. In many cases, press articles were claiming that these companies had succeeded in developing profitable operating models for conflict zones, urban slums and deep rural areas but before approaching them for personal interviews, we also verified these claims by examining their financial results. All companies approached had reported EBITDA figures that were above the industry average for both 2005 and 2006 . After contacting senior management, secondary data was reviewed and field visits were made to countries in Africa, South Asia and the Middle East and direct field observations and in-depth interviews took place with these companies.
Interviews were conducted with the CEO/Regional Managing Director and/or senior functional managers (typically the Chief Operating Officer and Marketing Director).
In the first round of interviews, the questions were open-ended and the goal was to gather as much information as possible. In the second round of interviews (that followed on average after 7 months from the first interview), the questions were targeted around specific themes that the initial analysis of the data had produced. In addition, the researchers were granted access to company reports and in several cases allowed to attend team meetings where strategic and operational decisions were made.
Detailed case studies were developed on firms that had been successful in serving low-income customers in the areas of interest (see Exhibit 1). The study followed directives for case-based research and was based upon multiple sources of evidence:
archival data, industry publications, interviews and direct observation. The study conformed with Yin's recommendations for developing construct validity and reliability. Multiple sources of evidence were used to achieve data triangulation, thereby reinforcing construct validity. As analysis of the companies under analysis evolved, progress was communicated to key executives and managers in the firms under analysis, thereby encouraging the early identification of possible rival explanations and ensuring internal validity.
From the academic literature, field visits and the development of case studies, the research was refined during 2009 in a reiterative process of application, testing and adaptation. Then, feedback from our academic colleagues, classroom discussions and further interviews with executives at our sample companies allowed us to identify shared approaches to strategic innovation in complex operating environments. These were used to build theory and make the concepts generic enough so as to be useful to managers from any industry.
What follows are some of the lessons we derived from our field research on how companies could operate successfully in complex operating environments such as conflict zones, slums and deep rural areas.
Winning Community Buy-in:
It is well established in the literature that to succeed in doing business in BOP markets, companies must be willing to reach out beyond their own organizational boundaries and create partnerships with local companies that can provide them with missing resources and expertise 12 . However, what we found in our own research is that to successfully do business in the kinds of environments that we have been describing, companies need to go beyond transactional partnerships. Instead, they need to win community trust and community buy-in. And this required for them to:
(a) seek out non-traditional partners who: (b) provided them with unorthodox benefits and who: (c) received unorthodox benefits in return.
First, consider, the issue of community buy-in. All the business leaders that we talked to emphasized the importance of going beyond building partnerships (which they considered important) to finding innovative ways to become "part of the fabric" of the local communities. Their goal was not to be perceived as "good foreigners" doing business in their communities but to be seen as "one of us". This was best articulated to us by the CEO of Iraq's Zain, Ali Al Dhawi: Right away, Zain embarked on a search for local Iraqi engineers. It did not bother the company if these people had no telecoms experience at all. The company was fortunate in that Iraq had maintained a strong higher education system and the locally qualified engineers who had traditionally worked in the oil industry had a high degree of grounding in core engineering concepts. Al Dhawi and his HR team brought these people into the company and sent them outside the country for quick training courses on building and operating a mobile network -in effect becoming a corporate university that provided the education and skills required to run its business.
The company knew that many of them would leave the company after receiving all this free training and education-but that did not bother Al Dhawi. Developing local entrepreneurs was part of "the price" that had to be paid if they were to be seen as part of the community. Within 60 days, Zain had a functioning network. Today, it has more than 80% population coverage. And the effort that Zain put into developing highly skilled local network engineers has been replicated across functions, with the company developing a cadre of young Iraqi professionals in disciplines such as marketing and communications, distribution and customer care.
Corporate social responsibility
All of the firms in our study were engaged in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in the communities in which they operated. All of them saw these CSR initiatives as key activities that allowed them to engage with and learn about the communities that they served. It is important to stress that almost all of the managers in firms that we interviewed in Africa, Asia and the Middle East emphasized the need to avoid paying bribes or dealing with criminal gangs, a practice that could lead to blackmail and spiralling demands. Many emphasized to us that engaging in such unethical or illegal activities was the quickest way to lose community support or destroy all the goodwill that they built over time. Instead, firms sough out entrepreneurs who were willing to build legitimate commercial relationships. They commented that they expected their local partners to deal with the local "goons" and put a layer of protection between the company and criminal elements in the community.
Unorthodox partners
The effort to become "one of the locals" led our sample companies to develop relationships with some unorthodox "partners". Rather than seek out local business people as partners, our sample companies sought out people who had a religious or political standing in the local community or who were eager to become entrepreneurs.
What they asked from them was not technology, distribution or other business assets.
Rather, they sought them out because they could influence the local population and/or offer them security, protection and a certain standing in the community. And what our sample companies offered them in return was not money or bribes. Rather, they Zain's partnership with local entrepreneurs taught the company many lessons on how to optimize operational processes in areas such as security and distribution. It also taught it some very specific measures on how to protect people from kidnapping and to ensure free passage of cash and other financial vehicles such as recharge cards.
With security a key priority, Zain initially recruited the services of two international security firms to protect its people and assets. But over time Al Dhawi recognized that security was best managed at the local level. As a result, Zain today has a more regional approach with security managed by ten local firms who are part of the communities in which they operate.
Similar to Vodafone Essar, Ali Al Dhawi recognised that experience in the mobile telecommunications industry was not a pre-requisite as the basis for a successful partnership -indeed in many developing and emerging markets this established experience is almost completely lacking. More important was basic commercial acumen, entrepreneurial spirit and a deep understanding of how to manage the local environment.
Unorthodox benefits
It should be obvious that the benefits that our sample companies were expecting from their local partners were not the usual benefits that we normally associate with joint ventures. Rather than partner to obtain missing business assets-such as help with distribution or consumer insights or even political connections-our sample firms sought partners that could help them navigate around local mafias and offer them security and protection against blackmail and kidnapping. Similarly, what the local partners expected was not just a business relationship. They wanted our sample firms to invest in them and to help them develop both as a local entrepreneur and as a local leader. In the words of Naveen Chopra, CEO of Vodafone Essar: Contracting mobile transmitter sites and maintaining the sites once they were built also posed unique difficulties. Village-level chiefs and religious leaders held significant power in many regions of Nigeria and Celtel needed to ensure that it respected this influence when investing in local areas. Even when approval was given by national authorities, the company needed to negotiate with tribal leaders before rolling-out its network infrastructure. This sometimes involved paying 'tribute', not just for approval to install equipment, but also for the entry of Celtel staff to tribal areas to maintain the network.
Many areas of Nigeria were in media 'black spots' which were not reached by television or radio signals. This made communicating products and services particularly challenging. Some of the traditional approaches of marketing were also difficult -billboards were quickly stolen and recycled for building materials or fencing, and it was dangerous in some regions for Celtel staff to travel for direct marketing activities at markets or other rural gatherings.
The Nigerian electricity grid was unreliable and did not reach all rural areas of the country, so generators were a necessity for virtually all of Celtel's rural base station sites. Every site required two diesel generators with the company using more than 70 million litres of diesel fuel per year. Access roads had to be maintained by the company with travel becoming limited during the rainy season when roads in many deep rural areas became impassable. Site security was a major concern and expense.
Vandalism and theft of base-station equipment was common, requiring Celtel to install armed guards on rural sites -Celtel employed some 2200 staff in 2007 plus some 5,000 contracted security staff on payroll. Even though Celtel typically recruited these guards from the local community, this had not seemed to reduce the incidence of theft of expensive equipment. 
Implementing new business models
Previous research on doing business in BOP markets has already alerted us to the fact that the business model that companies already employ in their developed markets
would not work well in BOP markets. As a result, this research has emphasized the importance of developing new business models for these markets 13 .
Our own research supported this basic finding. But what we also found was that the development of new business models was the easy part! More important than coming up with clever new business models was the need to get them implemented in inhospitable (and often dangerous) areas and then scaling them up in peaceful coexistence with the firm's existing business model. In other words, creativity was not the issue-implementation was. We identified three implementation areas that played a key role in determining success: (a) how to compete with two business models simultaneously; (b) how to build commitment and enthusiasm for the venture internally (so as to get key managers to agree to move to these dangerous areas!); and Vodafone Essar (India) had developed business models that were well suited for serving the middle and upper income segments in "stable" urban markets. They now faced the unpleasant fact that these business models were not appropriate to address the complexities of operating in urban slums or to reach the poor living in deep rural areas. Therefore, the issue that immediately arose for these firms was how to compete with two business models at the same time 1 .
This is an old "generic" strategy question. According to Porter, the challenge with attempting to manage two different business models in the same industry at the same time is that the two models (and their underlying value chains) could conflict with one another. As a result, a company that tries to compete in both positions simultaneously risks paying a huge straddling cost and degrading the value of its existing activities.
The task is obviously not impossible but it is certainly difficult. This is the logic that led Michael Porter to propose more than thirty years ago that a company could find itself "stuck in the middle" if it tried to compete with both low-cost and differentiation strategies 14 .
The primary solution offered to solve this problem is to keep the two business models (and their underlying value chains) physically separate in two distinct organizations. This is the "innovator's solution" that's primarily associated with Christensen's (1997) work on disruptive innovation but other academics have advocated it as well 15 .
And this is exactly the solution that researchers have proposed to help companies manage the business model they develop for BOP markets next to their existing business model 16 .
What we found from our own research was that simply creating a separate "unit" to compete in complex markets was not enough. Doing only that meant that the separate unit did not have the opportunity to exploit any synergies that existed between itself and the parent and did not have the means to transfer knowledge, expertise or other assets from the parent to its local operations. As Day, Mang, Richter and Roberts pointed out: "…the simple injunction to cordon off new businesses is too narrow.
Although ventures do need space to develop, strict separation can prevent them from obtaining invaluable resources and rob their parents of the vitality they can generate." 17 Therefore, to be successful, companies had to create a separate unit but also find ways to support it with assets and expertise from the parent. The key was to find ways to let it develop as it saw fit in its own environment while at the same time finding ways to leverage synergies between the unit and the parent company. It is the firms that achieved this delicate balance that succeeded in the implementation of their business model in complex environments.
We found that our sample firms used a variety of integrating mechanisms to keep the separate unit in the complex market in close working relationship with the parent.
Exhibit 2 lists some of the tactics that we observed in our sample firms. The most common tactic was to create separation in certain value-chain activities while keeping other activities integrated with those of the parent. The activities that were usually separated were those dealing with customer contact and included marketing, sales, distribution and front-line customer care. The activities that were usually kept integrated with the parent were those dealing with back-office tasks such as IT, accounting and HR. (the exception to this was Iraq where we did not witness significant differences in the organizational structures between urban and rural markets, probably because the entire market had more uniform characteristics).
-------------------------Put Exhibit 2 here -------------------------
The need to separate some of the value-chain activities was best-articulated to us by Lars Stork, COO of Celtel Nigeria:
"We understood that we had to develop new processes and approaches to reach out to the deep rural communities. The existing organizational processes worked well in our established urban markets in the presence of established distributors and a wide retail network but these partners were largely absent in small villages in the hinterland. We also had to rethink processes for marketing and customer care, as the mindset, literacy levels and understanding of very simple things such as using a mobile phone were at a very different stage of development. With these differences in mind, we decided to create dedicated regional teams with the responsibility to focus exclusively on developing the rural business."
But separation was not applied across the board. Most of the organizations that we studied did not separate elements of the business in which the processes and key performance metrics remained the same for both the 'core' business and the business serving customers in more challenging environments. For example, activities such as network roll-out and maintenance, support systems such as IT and billing, and call centre support were all shared between the parent and the unit. While there were some unique challenges in managing these shared activities (such as coping with language diversity in call centre operations in rural India), these were usually addressed by working in partnership with the separate marketing, sales and distribution teams rather than by creating entirely dedicated resources. Vodafone Essar's Naveen Chopra described it as follows:
"Our marketing manager who is responsible for slum marketing interfaces closely with our network engineers. She drives the necessary people and makes life miserable for the network team if they don't meet their network roll out in the slums for the month. She has open access to me at any given time and works with a cross-functional team who can put other things together if necessary. But she is the one main point of contact for the slums and she pushes to see that we are making the requisite progress on this initiative."
Vodafone Essar's slum marketing manager reported directly to Naveen Chopra. This level of senior executive sponsorship was indicative of the way that successful companies in our research sample managed their businesses in complex areas. The overall governance of the business entity serving the 'complex' market and the way this entity interfaced with established organizational functions such as operation management was typically in the hands of a 'heavyweight' executive -either the regional or national CEO or COO. This seemed to be particularly important in the early phases of growing the business in a 'complex' operating environment when the size of the new opportunity was not always readily apparent to the existing business and the priorities of senior functional managers were typically targeted towards acquisition and retention of high-value urban customers.
Finally, the separate unit operating in complex environments was encouraged by the parent's senior managers to borrow abundantly from the "core" business anything that would help it succeed. This included things such as brand names, physical assets, expertise and other useful processes of the main business. But even then, borrowed assets had to be customised to the local environment where they were put to use. 
Building internal enthusiasm
Companies that aim to compete in slums and conflict zones face two interrelated "internal" obstacles: first, how to convince the rest of the organization that there is a business opportunity there; and second, how to convince key personnel to work in and sometimes move to these areas, often with their families. Even if a business case for investment is made, it's not easy persuading people to move into such isolated and dangerous areas. Yet, the venture needs the knowledge, expertise and skills that managers from the parent company can provide. How, then, can a firm generate the internal commitment and enthusiasm necessary for investment and for getting key people to move to these areas?
The example of Airtel is indicative of how our sample companies managed this challenge. When Airtel expanded into Bihar and Jharkhand there was considerable internal scepticism as to how an area that was considered to be one of the most economically backward in the country and one that was also affected by violent insurgency and criminality, could be a profitable business opportunity. Primary healthcare as well as primary education and poverty levels were amongst the worst in the world and the region's telecommunications infrastructure had been badly neglected. The law and order situation was also very unstable and penetration of mobile telephony was very low. To generate support for such a venture, managers such as Rajnish Kaul followed a number of tactics: In Mumbai, Naveen Chopra and his team encountered a fundamental problem in serving the urban slums. So large were these highly populated shantytowns that the company struggled to deliver wireless network coverage in the deep inner reaches.
The company's initial response had been to beam into the slum from surrounding buildings with high intensity transmitters pointed down. But this did not achieve coverage deep inside the slum or inside the densely packed houses. The problem was how do put up a mobile transmitter in a place that was unauthorized, and also face the very real possibility of vandalism or theft of very expensive technical equipment if installed. Even if formal authority could be gained to put up a transmitter site in a slum, the reality was that government agencies had little real authority within slum communities. Furthermore, electricity supply was not reliable. The success of its approach saw Vodafone Essar's revenues from Mumbai's urban slums increase dramatically, with average revenues per user (ARPU) far exceeding the company's initial expectations. This was eventually understood in the context of the high value that slum dwellers place on telecommunication to conduct commerce and to find daily work outside the slum. Many slum dwellers in Mumbai engage in day labour as cooks, cleaners, drivers, construction and other informal service-sector jobs, and the mobile phone is seen as an essential tool to facilitate economic activity.
Just like Celtel Nigeria and Zain Iraq, Vodafone Essar has come to appreciate the value of learning from local business partners and to leverage their knowledge to codevelop business models for complex operating environments. Rather than arriving in a complex operating environment with pre-conceived solutions, the successful pursuit of complex operating environments appears to require learning from the 'ground up'.
Whereas the conventional wisdom on developing and emerging economies suggests that local partners are the ones that must unlearn, our study suggests that in complex operating environments the reverse is actually the case -it is the newly entering firm that needs to unlearn. This is what London and Hart (2004) have termed 'social embeddedness' or the ability to create competitive advantage based on a deep understanding of and integration with the local environment 19 .
Overcoming the problems of social embeddedness
Deep social embeddedness of the kind we have been describing here is not cost-free.
Uzzi warned that after a certain level, overembeddedness sets in, something that makes firms vulnerable to external shocks and insulates them from valuable information that exists outside their network 20 . It can also make them vulnerable to "selfish" partners who abuse their newfound power to extract more than their fair share of the rents.
The CEOs that we talked to were aware of these risks and they actively tried to manage them. One of the ways they did so was by continuously reminding their partners that theirs was a long-term relationship. If they did anything "stupid" for short-term gain, it would come back and hurt them later in the day. By investing to build and support the skills and capabilities of local partners, our research reveals that companies can improve their business performance in complex operating environments, while at the same time generating sustainable economic and social benefits. This is in alignment with the view that rather than focusing on those in developing and emerging markets purely as consumers, we need to view them as producers, and that the only sustainable way to alleviate poverty is to help in raising local skills and incomes 21 .
The final strategy that we observed being used to overcome the risks of overembeddedness-especially the risk of missing out on information that exists outside the network-was an open attitude and a great willingness to listen and learn.
In the face of complexity, accurate knowledge about potential consumers is not readily available and economic structures can be difficult to understand. This is not just true for foreign managers that might be entering a new market. These complex environments can be equally enigmatic for local managers who are not from the deep rural areas, slums or conflict regions that the firm chooses to enter -Ali Al Dhawi was a returning Iraqi national and Naveen Chopra is a native of India, but both men issued declarations of ignorance when entering their respective market spaces. Before launching the RAI initiative Lars Stork commissioned a large-scale field-based market study by Globalpraxis, a consulting firm specialized in conducting customer insight and route to market research in BOP markets. Indeed, virtually all of the successful firms that we examined as part of our research took three key steps: they dedicated internal resources to understanding the complexities of the new market; they recruited local people; and they supported business partners in developing and extending their own capabilities.
One cannot assume that a well-educated urbanite from the Indian or Nigerian middle class has an intuitive grasp of the social structures present in urban slums or deep rural areas. Furthermore, every region has its own peculiarities that need careful attention. In the words of Naveen Chopra: "a slum is not a slum is not a slum." We don't mean to imply that the strategies identified above eliminated the risks and costs associated with deep embeddedness. The important point is that our sample companies recognized that such costs existed and proactively took steps to manage them.
Conclusion
We started out by arguing that conflict zones, urban slums and deep rural areas have different structural characteristics from other BOP markets. This led us to propose that the strategies needed to succeed in these markets will necessarily be different from the strategies needed to succeed in other BOP market. Our results have supported this belief. For example, the existing BOP literature emphasizes the importance of entering BOP markets by using local partnerships. What we found in our own research is that to successfully do business in the kinds of environments that we have been describing, companies need to go beyond transactional partnerships.
Instead, they need to win community trust and community buy-in. And this required for them to: (a) seek out non-traditional partners who: (b) provided them with unorthodox benefits and who: (c) received unorthodox benefits in return.
In addition, the existing BOP literature emphasizes the importance of developing new business models specific to the BOP environment. Our own research supported this basic finding. But what we also found was that the development of new business models was the easy part! More important than coming up with clever new business models was the need to get them implemented in inhospitable (and often dangerous)
areas and then scaling them up in peaceful co-existence with the firm's existing business model. In other words, creativity was not the issue-implementation was.
Our research points to an optimistic conclusion: companies that adapt to the reality of doing business in the world's deep rural areas, urban slums and conflict zones could potentially earn significant profits. More importantly, they could use that experience to expand into similar regions in other parts of the world. For example, through its experience in the urban slums of Mumbai, the Vodafone Group is now in a strong position to leverage its accumulated learning in its operations in Africa where the firm's subsidiaries serve major urban slum populations. Similarly, Celtel-which was eventually acquired by the Zain Group-could leverage its learning from Nigeria to strategically innovate in other complex markets where it has operations. Not only might this improve the firms' growth and profitability but also-and perhaps more importantly-in the process of doing so, they can help these regions rejuvenate and escape poverty and lawlessness However, entering complex operating environments such as slums and conflict zones requires a recognition that traditional ways of doing business might not apply. To be successful, companies need to avoid reliance on 'legacy' operating approaches and understand the shortcomings of strategies based solely on the realities of the markets of the developed world. In addition to extending their own knowledge and capabilities into the new markets, companies must partner with local people who understand the intricacies of the complex environments in which they live, and work with these people to develop sustainable strategies that are 'bottom up' rather than top down.
The task is difficult but this is a worthwhile endeavour for firms to undertake. • Allow the unit to differentiate itself by adopting a few of its own value-chain activities but at the same time exploit synergies by ensuring that some valuechain activities are shared.
• Give the unit operational autonomy but exercise strong central strategic control.
• Allow the unit to borrow the brand name, physical assets and expertise from the parent.
• Assign a common general manager between the main and the new business.
• Hire "outsiders" to run the unit together with a mixture of "insiders"
• Allow different cultures to develop but unite the two through a strong shared vision and strong shared values.
• Staff the unit with individuals that have cross-functional expertise • Give the unit enough power to fight its own corner • Appoint an active and credible integrator between the two • Identify measurement and evaluation metrics that are specific to the unit.
